Portal-based access to advanced security infrastructures by Watt, J. et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Watt, J. and Sinnott, R.O. and Doherty, T. and Jiang, J. (2008) Portal-
based access to advanced security infrastructures. In: UK e-Science All 
Hands Meeting, 8-11 Sept 2008, Edinburgh, UK. 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/7392/ 
 
Deposited on: 8 September 2009 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
Portal-based Access to Advanced Security Infrastructures 
J. Watt, R.O. Sinnott, T. Doherty, J. Jiang 
National e-Science Centre, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK 
j.watt@nesc.gla.ac.uk 
Keywords : Shibboleth, OMII-UK, PERMIS, GridSphere, PKI, PMI, SPAM-GP 
 
Extended Abstract  
Security and scalable user management is one of 
the key challenges facing the e-Research 
community. The very nature of deploying new Grid-
enabled services involves the adoption of robust and 
highly complex underlying technologies such as 
PKIs. When used correctly, these tools allow many 
problems in the security domain to be tackled 
effectively, however in the hands of the 
inexperienced user, the complexities of building and 
using these technologies can expose the system to 
the same weaknesses that the system is trying to 
mitigate.  
OMII-UK aims to provide a core toolkit for 
download which automates the installation and 
configuration of tools like the Globus Toolkit as 
much as possible. Under the auspices of the OMII 
SPAM-GP project, NeSC Glasgow has been 
investigating providing JSR-168 portlet-based 
access to several key technologies in the security 
realm. Most effort in the UK community has been 
focussed on interfacing these technologies with 
large-scale resources such as the NGS, but there is 
still a scarcity of simple tools to allow remote sites 
to run up their own well-protected grid services. 
Shibboleth is fast becoming the de-facto solution 
to federated access management, allowing a user’s 
home credential, which previously only had meaning 
at the user’s institution, to be asserted reliably across 
a federation of trusted sites. SAML is used to 
transfer further information about a user to Service 
Providers, usually in the form of text string 
attributes. However it is normally the case that 
Services receive more information (from more 
Identity Provider sites) than they require. The 
SCAMP (Scoped Attribute Management Portlet) 
allows an administrator to edit the Service 
Provider’s Attribute Acceptance Policy (AAP) to 
only allow specific regular expressions from chosen 
Identity Providers using a GUI rather than editing 
raw XML.  This protects user confidentiality by only 
allowing the minimum amount of user information 
required to access protected services ever being 
exposed. 
OMII supplies a GridSphere 2.2 portal 
infrastructure to deploy portlet services. By default, 
GridSphere has a fairly coarse-grained access 
control policy which controls which users see which 
portlets based on some generic user roles stored in a 
local database. Yet in a complete federated system, 
it would be Shibboleth that should be providing this 
role information. The Content Configuration Portlet 
(CCP) has solved this problem by developing both a 
dedicated Shibboleth Authentication plug-in for 
GridSphere, and a role-mapping portlet for 
allocating roles asserted by Shibboleth to individual 
portlets. This means any user logging in via 
Shibboleth would only see the specific portlets they 
are authorised to invoke, based on externally 
provided roles.  
As a technology for providing a generic 
authorisation infrastructure for access to a variety of 
services, PERMIS is an ideal solution. The Attribute 
Certificate Portlet (ACP) allows an administrator (or 
delegated user) to issue X.509 Attribute Certificates 
(ACs) to local users, containing pre-agreed roles for 
access to local OR external services.  An externally 
hosted PERMIS-protected service would, at the start 
of a collaboration, be configured to accept the local 
authority as a trusted signer and search the local 
attribute authority for ACs assigned to that user. 
Note that here, Virtual Organisations are being 
implemented in a de-centralised fashion, meaning 
that every service in the collaboration is free to 
configure its PERMIS policy any way it chooses. All 
the collaboration needs to do is agree the attribute 
rules that will be used across the sites for access, 
then individual sites control the issuance of 
Shibboleth and PERMIS credentials. 
Using these tools all together, an administrator 
would be made aware of a new project, and the 
agreed text string attribute that Shibboleth can assert 
for user access. Using SCAMP, the service can be 
configured only to accept forms of this attribute 
string from the collaborating sites. The CCP can 
configure the user portal view based on these 
attributes, then the ACP can issue the required ACs 
containing the signed attribute string for its local 
users for any required services.  
SPAM-GP will be tested in a real use-case 
scenario supporting the SEE-GEO project, securing 
portal based access to a geographical and census 
data linking service, with the backend services 
protected by PERMIS. This will allow the data 
centres to set their own access policies, but leave 
user management to the individual collaborating 
sites.   
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Problem No. 1
• User management
– Historically done by providers of services
• Custom access control lists
– Maps user to rights on system
– Admin burden as user numbers skyrocket
• User registration required
– Face to face? Terms and conditions?
• User revocation process is essential
– User registered on many resources, always out-of-date info
– Certification Authority
• National-level identity – well recognised
– Still requires devolved user registration process (RA)
– Solution: Federated Access Management…
Shibboleth (SAML)
• Implements a federation of trusting sites who 
agree to recognise the identity assertions of 
their federation partners
– Federation manages registration and 
dissemination of current trusted sites
– Defines Identity Providers (IdPs) and Service 
Providers (SPs)
• IdP is an entity that has promised to correctly assert 
and verify the identity of its local users
– Hence, user identity within fed. resources is reliable
– Also supplies extra user info in SAML Attributes
• SP is a resource provider that accepts incoming 
federation authentication assertions as valid.
Logging In to a Service
• Input service URL, choose IdP, enter credentials, service
Shibboleth (SAML)
• May not be desirable for an SP to accept 
EVERY IdP in the federation 
– The Shibboleth Attribute Acceptance Policy (AAP) 
defines the SP rules for accepting:
• Identity Providers
• SAML Attribute types
• SAML Attribute values 
– The Scoped Attribute Management Portlet 
(SCAMP) allows this policy to be formally created
• Produces consistent XML based on the 
administrator’s policy requirements
SCAMP
• Policy Editor tool
– Defines valid IdPs, SAML attributes values and types
Problem No. 2
• Single sign-on
– Shibboleth enables one-time-password access for 
federation services.
– But services need to be able to utilise Shibboleth 
provided information to enforce access control
– Need to ALSO login to deployed portlet containers/apps 
to utilise their user management capability
• For GridSphere, we need to define a new authentication 
module/framework
– JAAS? – Couldn’t get it to work 
– Custom module? – Failed for GS2.2.X
– MAMS Shibbolized GridSphere – Yes
» Requires modification to handle complex Shibboleth 
roles
Content Configuration
• Module provides alternate login to GridSphere
– Picks up active Shibboleth credentials and builds 
GridSphere login session from this information
Content Configuration
• GridSphere now has an established user session with 
externally provided (from SAML) access privileges
– In addition to the custom GridSphere roles (USER, 
ADMIN, SUPER)
Content Configuration
• Layout manager can be used to assign Role 
Based Access Control on individual portlets
Problem No. 3
• Have presented solution for portal based 
access control
– Doesn’t allow access to external security 
infrastructures
– Scenario: protected service has a policy requiring 
a signed assertion of a user’s role, traceable to a 
reliable Source of Authority, with a finite validity
• PERMIS
– Need to issue local users with X.509 Attribute 
Certificates for access to these services…
Attribute Certificate Portlet
• Portlet allows a privileged user to issue Attribute Certificates 
(based on Shibboleth-provided roles if required) to users 
and store in LDAP
– ‘privileged user’ may be local admin who has been delegated 
ability to assign attributes, OR, the admin of the external 
service who has been given attribute assignment privileges 
within the portal
SPAM-GP Deployment
• Presence in SEE-GEO and DAMES
– PERMIS-protected GT4 services accessed 
through an RBAC-enabled portal utilising SAML- 
provided information
• ACP and SCAMP
– Unzip .tar.gz file and ‘ant deploy’
• CCP
– Requires change to GridSphere source and re- 
installation
Security for SEE-GEO GLS Client
• SPAM-GP tools in green
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Status
• SCAMP code complete
– May require slight alteration for “100%” JSR-168
– Submitted for evaluation, docs available
• ACP functional
– Requires user interface clean-up
– PERMIS license issues
• CCP
– Have a deployable solution that draws on MAMS software
– Alterations documented
• ARP & PERMIS policy editor (not done)
– Relegated as they are essentially SP-external
– Tools have emerged that provide this functionality (ARPeditor, 
ShARPe…)
• All tools will be utilised in future NeSC projects, so 
improvements/augmentations are inevitable
